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THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF RULE 11
REMARKS OF ROBER T L. CAR TER *
My job this evening is to tell you about my view of the history of the
amendment to Rule 11 and why it came into being. I think that it is fair
to say that the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 is part of an effort to reduce
delays and expenses in litigation, and to dam the flood of litigation that is
threatening to inundate the courts. As you know, the Advisory Commit-
tee proposed the changes in Rule 11 as part of a package of changes. It
was proposed that Rule 16 would be amended to speed cases along and
reduce costs by broadening trial judges' case management powers.I Ma-
jor changes in Rule 26 were suggested to enable judges to limit excessive
discovery and to punish abuses.2 The Committee proposed amending
Rule 11 to deter the submission of frivolous or groundless pleadings and
motions.3
The intent of Rule 11 as originally promulgated was also to deter frivo-
lous actions.4 It required attorneys to certify that there were good
grounds for their pleading. In addition, the Rule provided for the impo-
sition of sanctions for violations. The Rule's provisions applied to mo-
tions and other papers through incorporation by reference in Rule 75
However, for reasons I will discuss in a moment, the old Rule 11 simply
did not work. The new 1983 amendment was designed to put teeth into
the old rule.
How did the Committee intend to sharpen Rule 1 l's bite? Primarily,
in two ways. First, the new Rule clarifies the standard that the attorney
or party who signs the papers must meet. The old Rule 11 did not ex-
plicitly cast on the signator any affirmative duty to investigate the claim.
Read literally, the old Rule required the signator simply to read the
pleading; if, after reading it, he or she could certify to the best of his or
her knowledge, information and belief that there was good ground to
support the pleading, no further inquiry was required.6 The 1983
amendment does require inquiry beyond the four corners of the pleading.
It explicitly places on the signator an affirmative duty to investigate the
* Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
1. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory comm. note; Vairo, Analysis of August 1, 1983
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in ALI-ABA, 1 Civil Practice and
Effective Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts 59 (Aug. 1985 ed.).
2. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note.
3. See Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory comm. note; Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J.
1648, 1648 (1981); Vairo, supra note 1, at 61; Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chair-
man, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman, and
Members of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Mar. 9, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Mansfield Letter], reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 190, 192 (1983).
4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note.
5. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 & advisory comm. note; Vairo, supra note 1, at 61.
6. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540-41 (1982).
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facts and the law before certifying them.7
The affirmative duty to investigate, however, should not really be con-
sidered an innovation because the courts have always interpreted the old
Rule to impose such a duty. As early as 1939, federal courts were speak-
ing of a lawyer's general duty of investigation.' By the time the amend-
ment was proposed in 1981, it was well settled that an attorney had to
satisfy himself or herself that there were good grounds for the pleading.9
However, the extent to which an attorney had to investigate the prima
facie validity of the claims he or she was asserting in the pleadings was
not well settled under the old rule. There were really two questions here:
First, precisely what did the attorney have to believe, and second, how
sure did he or she have to be?
The old Rule provided only vague answers. Precisely what did the
attorney have to believe? That there was "good ground" to support the
pleading. But it was not clear what "good ground" meant. The source
of the phrase was an 1838 treatise on equity pleading by Joseph Story.",
Justice Story traced the rule that counsel must sign bills in equity back to
the time of Sir Thomas More, and wrote that the purpose of the rule was
to secure the guarantee of counsel "that upon the instructions given to
them, and the case laid before them, there is"-and here is the phrase-
"good ground for the suit in the manner, in which it is framed."' "I Jus-
tice Story's view that pleadings had to be signed to certify their good
grounds was incorporated into the Equity Rule of 1842. The 1842 Rule
was replaced by the substantially similar Equity Rule of 1912, which
served as the source for the Rule 11 provision.'
2
The upshot of all this is that the phrase "good ground" was not de-
fined when it was first used in 1838, and it remained a rather loose stan-
dard throughout the years. Left particularly vague in Rule 11 was
whether "good ground" referred only to the factual assertions in the
pleading, or whether the signator had to certify the legal claims as well.
Courts that faced the issue tended to imply a duty to certify both. 3
Also unsettled under the old Rule 11 was the second question regard-
ing the extent of the investigation required-how sure the attorney had
to be before he or she could sign the pleadings. The language of the old
rule did not require certainty; it asked only for the best of the attorney's
knowledge, information and belief. 4 Fairly quickly, courts interpreted
7. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 & advisory comm. note; Vairo, supra note 1, at 64.
8. See Nieman v. Long, 31 F. Supp. 30, 31 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
9. Miller v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
10. J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings 50 (1832). On this point generally,
see Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement Some "Striking" Problems with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
11. J. Story, supra note 10, § 47, at 50.
12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note; Risinger, supra note 10, at 13.
13. See, eg., Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 15 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972).
14. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540 (1982).
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this to mean that an attorney could not certify a pleading if he or she
affirmatively knew that the pleading was false.1" In 1961, the Southern
District took the standard one step further, when Judge Bicks ruled in
Freeman v. Kirby1 6 that it was possible to violate Rule 11 even if the
attorney did not actually know the claim was false.17 In that case, the
attorney decided to file a suit for fraud in the names of persons whom he
had never met, at a time before he received the memoranda that he later
claimed were the source of his grounds to support the allegations in his
complaint."'
When the attorney did receive the memoranda, shortly before filing the
complaint, he did not know who authored them, and did not inquire into
their truth. If he had investigated, he would have learned that the mem-
oranda were written by lawyers in another firm who, at the time of the
writing, were not satisfied that any fraud had been committed, and who
felt that all of the evidence was unreliable rumor and hearsay.19 So the
attorney who fied the suit did not affirmatively know the allegations in
his complaint were false, but he also did not make even the barest of
inquiries. On this basis, Judge Bicks ruled that the attorney had violated
Rule 11. Eventually, the courts came to settle on the subjective and
rather nebulous standard of good faith:20 So long as the attorney be-
lieved in good faith that there were good grounds, Rule 11 could not be
invoked against him or her.21
The courts tended to find good faith rather easily. For example, it has
been held that an attorney who relied solely on allegations in a Wall
Street Journal article acted in good faith.2 2 Also, in the 1980 case of
Nemeroff v. Abelson,23 the Second Circuit ruled that as long as an action
was not entirely without foundation, an attorney could not be held to
have acted in bad faith.
Thus, the old Rule's standards for signing were neither precise nor
strict. The amendments were designed to clarify and tighten the Rule's
requirements. They do this by answering the same two questions in a
different way. What does the attorney have to believe? That the plead-
ing is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. This
may not be any stricter than the old "good ground" standard, but it cer-
tainly is much more precise. It specifies that the attorney must vouch for
both the facts and the law.24
15. Eg., American Auto Ass'n v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
16. 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
17. See id. at 397.
18. Id. at 398.
19. Id.
20. See Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
21. Eg., Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. See In re Ramada Inns Secs. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-35 (D. Del. 1982).
23. 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 & advisory comm. notes; Vairo, supra note 1, at 64.
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How sure, then, does the attorney have to be? The new rule still does
not require certainty, but it requires certification to the best of the attor-
ney's knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry.'5 The amendment thus replaces the vague good faith formula with
a reasonableness standard. As the Advisory Committee Note makes
clear, reasonableness is intended to be a stricter and more precise stan-
dard than good faith.26 It is expected that a greater range of circum-
stances will trigger violations of the new rule. The judicial inquiry will
no longer focus on what the signator subjectively believed, but rather
whether the signator's inquiry was objectively reasonable given time con-
straints, availability of facts, and so on.2 7 A lawyer who certifies his or
her pleadings in good faith but after an unreasonable investigation would
have satisfied the old Rule 11, but would be subject to sanctions under
the 1983 version.'
Now, I said earlier that the amendment to Rule 11 was designed to
reduce expense and delay in two ways. The first was to clarify the stan-
dard that attorneys had to meet before they could sign papers. The sec-
ond, and I turn to this now, was to deter abuses by granting to the trial
judges clear authority to impose sanctions for violations of the rule.
The old Rule provided for sanctions too, but for various reasons they
were rarely invoked. Actually, the old Rule had two separate provisions
regarding sanctions. Unsigned pleadings, or pleadings signed with intent
to defeat the purpose of the Rule, would be stricken as sham and false.
This was a pretty radical sanction: The client was made to suffer for the
excesses of the attorney. The severity of this sanction caused a sort of
judicial paralysis-judges were reluctant to impose the sanction even
when attorneys violated the Rule.29 The courts established a very high
threshold for imposition of this sanction: A pleading could be stricken
under Rule 11 only if it contradicted matters of public record,3" or could
be shown to be sham and false beyond peradventure,31 or if the plaintiff
had no capacity to sue.32 According to a 1976 law review article,3 1 since
25. See Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P.
11.
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note; cf. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339,
350 (2d Cir. 1980) (pre-1983 Rule 11 phrased in subjective terms; standard was one of
"bad faith").
27. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note; Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs
Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure, Natl L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col 1;
Vairo, supra note 1, at 65.
28. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note.
29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note; see, e g., Blanchette v. Cataldo, No.
78-2368-S (D. Mass. June 23, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (court
reluctant to impose sanctions); Textor v. Board of Regents, 87 F.R.D. 751, 754 (N.D. IlL
1980) (same).
30. Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214, 215 (9th Cir. 1972).
31. See Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing Murchison v.
Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)).
32. See Incomco v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 558 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1977).
33. Risinger, supra note 10, at 34-37.
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the Rule was promulgated in 1938 there have been only eleven cases re-
sulting in findings of Rule 11 violations.34 Of these, four were disposed
of on other grounds, so that the propriety of the Rule 11 striking was not
readily testable on appeal.35 Of the remaining seven, the courts actually
struck the pleadings in only two cases.6 One case of striking was re-
versed on appeal,37 and one case was ultimately successful.38
The second provision in the old Rule was that the attorney could "be
subjected to appropriate disciplinary action" 39 for a willful violation.
The Rule did not specify what sort of discipline was contemplated, and
this necessarily led to some confusion regarding the range of available
sanctions.' Some courts implied from Rule 11 a power to impose court
costs, including attorney's fees.41 This was often viewed as an applica-
tion of the general rule that federal courts award counsel fees when the
opposing side has initiated or conducted a suit in bad faith.42 Another
sanction-contempt-was specifically mentioned as an available sanction
in the May, 1936 preliminary draft of the Rule, but was omitted in the
final report.4 3 It was rarely imposed in practice. An even more drastic
sanction, disbarment, was applied still more rarely. The only reported
case of disbarment under Rule 11, for gross misrepresentation to the
court, was reversed for lack of due process."
As the Advisory Committee Note stresses, abusive pleadings and dis-
covery were often permitted under the old Rule because of both confu-
sion over the range of appropriate sanctions and a perceived reluctance
to impose any sanctions at all.4 The amendment overcomes these
problems in several ways. First, the word "sanctions" is added to the
34. Id. at 36.
35. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.V.I. 1973);
Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Calla-
ghan) 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972); Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F.
Supp. 531, 535 (W.D. La. 1968); Nichols v. Alker, 126 F. Supp. 679, 684 (E.D.N.Y.
1954), afl'd, 231 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
36. No action was taken in two cases, and alternative sanctions were imposed in three
others. Risinger, supra note 10, at 37.
37. See Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214, 215 (9th Cir. 1972).
38. See Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 541 (1982).
40. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1334 (1969 &
Supp. 1985); Risinger, supra note 10, at 14-17.
41. See Textor v. Board of Regents, 87 F.R.D. 751, 754-55 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Driscoll
v. Oppenheimer & Co., 500 F. Supp. 174, 175 (N.D. MI. 1980); Folding Cartons, Inc. v.
American Can Co., No. 76-C-1113 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1980) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); cf. Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F.
Supp. 975, 982-83 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (court awarded attorneys' fees on Rule 11 motion).
But see Republic of Cape Verde v. A & A Partners, 89 F.R.D. 14, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(court refused to grant attorney's fees under Rule 11).
42. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-67 (1980).
43. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 36, § 1331.
44. See In re Lavine, 126 F. Supp. 39, 51 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd sub. nom In re Los Ange-
les County Pioneer Soc'y, 217 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1954).
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note.
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caption to alert practitioners to the provisions within the Rule. The trial
judge's power to award costs and fees is made explicit, and some sort of
sanction is made mandatory-the Rule states that the court "shall""
impose sanctions, in place of the old rule's "may"'4 impose sanctions.
The new Rule also makes it explicit that either the attorney or the client,
or both, can be punished.
The new Rule deletes the willfulness requirement, making it easier for
judges to impose sanctions. However, the Advisory Committee Note
adds that the court should take account of the party's presumed or actual
knowledge when considering the nature and severity of sanctions.4 8 The
new Rule also deletes the awkward provision allowing for the striking of
pleadings. Of course, pleadings can still be stricken under Rules 8, 12 or
56. In short, the new Rule makes the threat of sanctions more credible,
in order to deter the submission of groundless pleadings.
When the Advisory Committee sat down to review the old Rule 11,
they noted several important weak points.49 The Committee introduced
various new provisions to strengthen Rule 11. Some were designed to
introduce substantive changes. Others were intended merely to codify
the gloss that judges had put on the old rules since 1938. But even in the
latter cases, everyone's awareness of the Rule could be increased and the
Rule's policy of deterrence furthered, by explicitly stating the duties and
available sanctions. To the extent that the amendment has served this
warning function, and certainly to the extent that the amendment calls
for new higher standards, it is a significant step toward reducing unneces-
sary costs and delays in litigation.
46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 541 (1982).
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory comm. note.
49. Id.
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